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THE ACT TRANSPORT- 
PANACEA FOR THE 80's OR DESIGNER'S ILLUSION? 
Panel discussion 
Active control technology is being promoted as a panacea for the transports of 
the 1980's, reaping performance gains, fuel savings, and increased return on 
investment. Are these projections realistic or merely designer's illusions? 
A panel discussion was held at the symposium which attempted to make an 
objective and pragmatic assessment of the standing of active control technology. 
The discussion focused on the standing of active control technology relative to civil 
air transport applications, the value as opposed to the cost of the projected benefits, 
the need for research, development, and demonstration, the role of government and 
industry in developing the technology, the major obstacles to its implementation, and 
the probable timing of the full utilization of active control technology in commercial 
transportation . 
The panel moderator was Joseph Weil, Director of Research at the NASA Flight 
Research Center. The panel members were William E .  Lamar, Deputy Director, 
Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory; Richard P.  Skully , Director, Flight Stand- 
ards Services, Federal Aviation Administration; Arthur J .  K .  Carline, Manager, 
Advanced Transport Technology Fort Worth Division, General Dynamics Corpora- 
tion; Clifford F. Newberry, Director of Engineering Wichita Division, The Boeing 
Company; Franklin W . Kolk , Vice President, Systems Planning, American Airlines, 
Incorporated; and Lloyd L. Treece , Vice President, Flight Operations-Control 
Division, United Air  Lines, Incorporated. 
.---- 
The following is an edited transcription of the prepared statements of the panel 
members and the subsequent open discussion between the panel and the audience. 
A list of attendees is presented in the appendix. 
T .  L .  K .  SrnulZ: Welcome to the ninth session of the symposium, which is a 
panel discussion on the topic "The ACT Transport-Panacea for the 80's or  Designer's 
Illusion?" The moderator for the panel is Joseph Weil, Director of Research at the 
NASA Flight Research Center. This session is being tape recorded, and a trans- 
cription will appear in the proceedings. 
J .  W e i l :  Some of you may feel somewhat perplexed at this point. You may be 
wondering whether active control technology and control-configured vehicles are 
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ready for general application to advanced transport design or whether they are 
being oversold. Another question is whether events should set their own pace or 
the government should increase its support of this technology. The last paper 
yesterday, by Dick Holloway , provided an indication of what might be done to 
exploit the new concepts. 
This morning we are fortunate to have on our panel six distinguished visitors , 
who wil l  give us the benefit of their experience. We have allowed each panelist 
the option of using 10 minutes to express any general views he might have on the 
overall topic of discussion. The panel will  then focus its discussion on three inter- 
related questions: what are the potential payoffs of active control technology , what 
are the biggest obstacles to its implementation, and what new programs are needed 
to expedite its use in commercial transports. We are anxious to have enough time 
to discuss these subjects, because we feel they are extremely important. At the 
end of the panel discussion, we will  accept comments and questions from the 
audience. 
At this point I would like to introduce Ken Carline, who will begin the discus- 
sion. 
COMMENTS BY PANEL MEMBERS 
A .  J .  K .  Carline: What is active control technology anyway? In the past, 
we've always been sure to relate advances in technology to the way they affect the 
airlines. I'm talking now in the context of this particular symposium, which is 
related to transport aircraft, although we've also heard some discussion of fighters. 
The payoff-what's the payoff? I'm not sure that we really know what the payoff 
is. We've heard about taking weight out of the wing based on maneuver and gust 
load alleviation systems, but then we have a problem with fatigue, and we have to 
put some weight back in because now the wing has a fatigue life of only 5000 hours 
instead of 30,000 hours or something like that. So I'm not sure that all the money 
we've spent and all the studies we've done have shown a payoff yet. I think we 
ought to determine what we are doing with active control technology-it's got to pay 
off. Nothing I've seen yet proves that there is a payoff. We've seen General 
Dynamics and Boeing and Lockheed comparisons , and the benefits vary from 1 per- 
cent to 1 2  percent, which, I think, emphasizes the problem. I think we ought to 
spend some money on some really meaningful studies, something on the order of 
$1 million instead of $10 , 000, and get some meaningful answers on the real payoff. 
We ought to get the airlines in the act as well, not after the fact, the way we usually 
do. I was rather disconcerted to find that the panel organized to develop design 
criteria didn't include a member of the airlines. So I think we ought to determine 
the payoff. I believe there is one, but I'm not sure how much of one it is. 
The other thing we ought to look at closely is how we can get the question of 
reliability sorted out. And we ought to think about how we could certify an air- 
plane. Then we should implement active control-functions, in , say , 10 or 1 2  cargo 
airplanes and find out what they do for us.  Maybe putting an active control system 
into a cargo airplane will  extend its fatigue life from 40,000 hours to 60,000 hours. 
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At the same time, I think we ought to have a good demonstrator airplane with 
active control functions, and not one where we can only alter the wing because we 
can't move the landing gear or  something, as with the JetStar. We mustn't have too 
many restraints, or the answers won't be meaningful. I suggest that we build an 
airplane with a digital fly-by-wire system with no mechanical backup. Incidentally, 
the Concorde has flown 2700 hours, in monsoons and in Alaska, and they have 
never had a failure which would have embarrassed them if they had not had a 
mechanical backup system, so the record is pretty good. 
Finally, we should take a serious look at flutter suppression, which I think 
worries people quite a bit. 
First, let us determine the benefits of incorporating active control technology 
systems individually and in combination. We may need different combinations for 
different purposes. For a short haul we may need one combination, for a medium 
haul maybe another, because they have different and sometimes conflicting require- 
ments. The studies should include detailed maintenance costs, where this is 
possible, and equipment redundancy requirements. Then, if the studies show the 
systems to be worthwhile, and I don't think we've really demonstrated that yet, 
NASA should sponsor two programs. In one, a technology demonstrator aircraft, 
for example a business jet with minimum restraints, could be fitted with .the most 
promising active control functions, including a digital fly-by-wire system, which 
I believe to be the most promising. In the other , a small fleet of cargo airplanes 
could be modified to incorporate one or  more active control functions in order to 
accumulate a bank of reliability and maintainability information. These programs 
would prove or disprove the studies we've done. I also think we'd do well to track 
the record of the Concorde control system. I talked for 2 hours with maintenance 
people last week, and they gave me a lot of information that showed its record to be 
good. They hadn't had any really significant failures. And the track record of the 
equipment was pretty good. I also think we ought to do a lot more research on 
flutter suppression. I think we are a long way from taking material out of the wing. 
Perhaps in time, in some future commercial transport, but I don't think it will be 
the next one. 
R .  P .  SkuZZy: I would like to start by saying that the FAA anticipates the incor- 
poration of active control technology into civil transport aircraft with confidence 
and a sense of readiness. I'd like to mention some of the things we have done and 
are doing to prepare for the application of active control technology and control- 
configured concepts in the transport airplanes presented to the FAA for civil certi- 
fication and commercial operation. First, the Federal Aviation Regulations have 
already been amended to accommodate the unprecedented technological advances of 
the decades just past. For example , a few years ago the captain's instruments 
were really kept separate and when integrated systems came into being, we 
amended the rules to require that their design be such that the loss of display of 
information essential to safety in flight would be extremely improbable. 
In addition, the operating rules have been changed to recognize inertial naviga- 
tion systems and low weather minimum landing systems. In both cases, accuracy 
and reliability had to meet stringent criteria before we would approve using the 
equipment in operational aircraft. Area navigation systems of varying degrees of 
807 
sophistication have been accepted into the national airspace system. Digital 
distance-measuring equipment has been taken in stride, and altitude alerting and 
many other systems have come into being within the framework of the existing opera- 
tional and airworthiness rules. The ground proximity warning system has been 
certificated and is being used today in some transport aircraft. 
When a new aircraft is presented for FAA certification, we might find that it has 
" flight characteristics or design features that were not envisioned when the rules 
were first written. We then apply what we refer to as special conditions to make 
certain that the current high level of safety is maintained when these new features 
are incorporated. Recognizing that our regulations do not always reflect the state 
of the ar t ,  we've initiated a new system of periodic airworthiness reviews. The 
last such review conference was held as I recall in 1960. Over 1000 changes to the 
regulations were proposed and are now being commented on by all interested parties 
in industry and government. In December of this year we will  have a public meeting 
in Washington, D C in which the spokesmen for the various organizations will  have 
an opportunity to present their views. We plan to have a 2-year cycle to minimize 
delays in implementing amendments to the regulations. This airworthiness review 
conference is being scheduled for 8 working days, and we are anticipating many 
people from outside the United States. 
Another thing we are proposing is the introduction of flight simulation as a 
substitute for a significant portion of the airworthiness certification process. As  
most of you know, we have already authorized the use of approved flight simulators 
for certain pilot certification and proficiency requirements , The simulator will be 
used to plan and practice the certification flight program and to make preliminary 
evaluations of new aircraft , so that critical flight conditions can be pinpointed. 
Flight tests will be limited to the validation of these critical conditions. This will  
provide a way for industry to test its ideas against FAA standards, and, where 
appropriate , the FAA can develop new standards to cover new aircraft capabilities. 
This, in turn , will  offer industry the potential for creating new markets and 
perhaps prompt international competition . 
The responsibility for developing this proposal into a successful program should 
be shared by NASA, the FAA , and the aviation industry. The role NASA plays may 
be to provide advanced simulators and data reduction facilities. Automated data 
processing for the simulator data is needed, of course. In addition, NASA engi- 
neering support could help the industry and the FAA to become more familiar with 
NASA's facilities and provide a useful exchange of research information. Industry 
can provide a mathematical model for the vehicle, validated, if possible, by proto- 
type testing. Industry could also be responsible for the bookkeeping and updating 
of the mathematical model, provide the engineering and pilot support for the pro- 
grams, and participate with the FAA during the simulator tests. The FAA can pro- 
vide engineering and pilot participation in the simulator tests of the vehicle's math- 
ematical model and establish the requirements for aircraft certification. Of course , 
both NASA and the FAA would assume responslbility for the proprietary rights of 
the industry. 
The FAA is ready to pursuee with your support, new areas of technology, 
including new applications of propulsive lift, advanced structures , synthetic 
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stability, digital controls, and other new designs. We're looking forward to working 
with all these groups in the near future. 
W. E .  Lamar: The question of transitioning technology i s ,  of course , of consid- 
erable interest to people at the Air  Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory. The only 
reason the laboratory exists is to develop new technology and see that it is applied. 
If it isn't applied, people wonder what the laboratory is for. So the application of 
new technology is of paramount importance to us. 
In answer to one of the comments , I believe we have made progress. I don't 
mean just the laboratory; industry, NASA, and this nation have all helped to develop 
the basis for this technology. Many aircraft that incorporate active control tech- 
nology are actually flying, demonstrating a portion of the technology and in some 
cases a significant portion. The YF-16 airplane is a brand new vehicle which 
incorporates a fly-by-wire system and relaxed static stability. So we know how to 
do it,  we know that we can make this technology work. I 
There are several questions, however. First, what is the real need, and what 
is the payoff? Now here , I think, there is a lot of room for work. Ken Carline 
brought this up , and I couldn't agree with his remarks more. Analyses must be 
made in depth to make it clear that there really is a payoff, and that the payoff 
doesn't vanish when you get to the suboptimization that results when you look at 
the whole system. You've got to be sure that the payoffs remain. I remember the 
Boeing experience and the supersonic transport, They considered active flutter 
suppression using the flight control system. A s  I remember estimates of 
9000 pounds in weight savings were made because of the flutter suppression system. 
As the design progressed and they got into the problems of the total system, a lot 
of the apparent savings vanished. So you've got to make sure that the studies are 
in enough depth to have a total system viewpoint. You need that confidence. 
It's likely that the first application of this technology will  be to provide fixes 
for current aircraft. The C-5 airplane is an excellent example. Studies of the 
application of load alleviation and mode stabilization to the C-5 aircraft were made 
long ago. At that time there was very little need for that technology. Now it is 
being applied, and I think the papers by Lockheed showed the depth of the studies 
necessary to find out the best way to apply it. Now, if the application of active load 
distribution technology improves the aircraft's life by a factor of two, the improve- 
ment is significant; it's a tremendous payoff, one that essentially saves an airplane, 
because you fly double the time. 
I think that there are a lot of cases in which this technology will be used to fix 
problems, but if it is going to be applied to new aircraft I think we'll have to have 
a crisis of some type, or a national need. That means we need the techqology in 
hand, ready to go. The space program got started because of the Russian sputnik, 
and the intercontinental ballistic missile program got started because of the missile 
gap. We couldn't get any money for structural development until an F-111 wing 
fell off, and then we ran into problems with the C-5 airplane. There has to be a 
crisis of some type. Sometimes it is in a safety area or in a C-5 type of area. 
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To apply this to the airlines, and I must say to the Air Force too maintainabil- 
ity must be determined, because overhead and maintenance costs are taking a big 
portion of the total dollars available. If this keeps up we won't have any money for 
new systems, so we'll have to do something about insuring maintainability. We've 
got to make sure the risks and uncertainties are understood, that there are no 
surprises that appear after we fly a number of months. This has happened with 
many aircraft, like the T-tailed aircraft, for example. So you've got to know what 
the costs are,  and our ability to ascertain costs in advance is really only in a 
beginning stage. People don't have much confidence that we can estimate costs 
properly. We need a thorough study to do that. 
' 
Then there's the question of criteria, specifications. Military specification 
8785B in principal provides the criteria, but there is a need for a specific meeting 
on reliability requirements. The specifications are undergoing revision. I think 
what's required here is a concerted effort to determine acceptance criteria. There 
are pretty good criteria for engines: they have a 50- or 60-hour preliminary flight 
rating test (PFRT) , and if an engine passes that test, it's considered adequate for 
a new airplane. Later, there's a model test, which is more thorough, and when it 
passes that it's ready to go into production. Now, because of some engine problems 
they are now changing the engine specifications somewhat and trying to tailor 
them more to the usage requirements of the airplane. We need to do the same thing 
in the flight control area. We need to understand just what the technology people 
must do to prepare the technology for transition. But this means that the users 
have to get together with the certifiers and the contractors and agree what kind of 
proof is necessary to make the transition in the technology. Then maybe we can 
start filling the gaps. 
And there are quite a few gaps. For example, we're still not sure about the 
effects of lightning on fly-by-wire systems. Right now we do not permit our F-4 
fly-by-wire airplane to fly in lightning. We do not permit the YF-16 airplane to 
fly near lightning either. I'm sure that as the program proceeds things will  be 
done to determine the effects of lightning. These are unusual problems, but we've 
got to solve them, and make sure we are completely ready for operation, We've 
got to get clear acceptance criteria, and right now they are not clear. 
There are many approaches that one can take to application, but certainly a 
fix-up approach, as  on the C-5 airplane, where the technology is applied step by 
step in nonflight-safety areas, is the first step. For example, when gust load 
alleviation is applied and it works, you get gust load alleviation and you save some 
fatigue damage. When it doesn't work, you get a little more fatigue damage on one 
flight, but next time you fix it. The problem is to make sure that it doesn't screw 
up some other system and interact in the wrong way from a flight safety standpoint. 
That's a way to apply the technology safely and get experience. Certainly the 
Air Force is getting a lot of experience with command augmentation systems. They 
are basically the same as fly-by-wire systems. They work, and we get a good 
understanding of their reliability, so we are much more willing to go to full depend- 
ence on electronic systems. 
From the airline's viewpoint, I would think that putting a system in a nonpassen- 
ger cargo airplane might be a good way to acquire experience with the technology. 
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Maybe the pilots will want ejection seats, which is different from normal airline 
practice, but it's a way to get lots of time and experience with the technology in the 
airline environment. You can also apply the technology with systems that have 
backups. When we first flew the F-4 fly-by-wire flight control system, it did have 
a mechanical backup. After flying a while we had enough courage to take it out. 
So keeping the backup in at first may be a way to build up enough confidence to 
take it out. Later on, you can apply it to completely new designs. Again , there 
ought to be clear acceptance criteria. I think these are things we need to do. 
C. F .  Newberry: When the apostle Paul wrote his letter to the church of 
Corinth , he commented that they compared themselves among themselves and 
commended themselves. He said that if their spiritual life was as good as they 
indicated, it should have affected the way they were living. I've spent 2 days at 
this meeting now , and I think I have somewhat the same feeling. As we compare 
our technology as experts among experts, we should ask ourselves why we aren't 
using this technology. Dick Holloway addressed this question a little bit yesterday, 
and I'd like to reconsider some of his comments and questions. 
First , we're faced with a balance between the benefits and the risks of this 
technology. We want to tip the scales in favor of the benefits. The risks are safety 
and economics. From an airline's standpoint, the economic risk may be the system's 
reliability and maintainability. From the manufacturer's standpoint , the risk may 
be product liability or the cost of retrofitting a fleet if the technology is introduced 
into an operating fleet prematurely. The other part of the economic risk may be 
letting the competition get ahead of you, The benefits, of course , include such 
:hings as lower cost , better performance , or both. 
There is a decided difference between the acceptable risk-to-benefit ratio for 
he military and the commercial airlines. The military often has the opportunity to 
est new systems in prototype airplanes or at least to fit the system into an experi- 
iental situation and to try it out to evaluate the risk before committing itself to 
roduction. This is not generally true in the commercial airlines. The one notable 
vception to this is the Boeing Model 367-80 (Dash-Eighty) , which introduced the 
-707 fleet. There again, it was a high risk, high payoff situation. Therefore , it 
important for the risk to be minimized before introducing new technology into 
mmercial aviation and expecting it to be accepted. 
We've reviewed various aspects of active control technology in the last couple 
days, and all of us can draw our own risk curves. There are different levels of 
k for different concepts. The noncritical aspects , such as load alleviation , 
igue reduction, and ride control are pretty well accepted. I think the risk of 
roducing these would be low. If there is a problem, the airplane can recover 
ely after it is switched out of the system. What little reduction we might have in 
gue life during landing would be of no consequence. 
The fly-by-wire and stability augmentation systems are a bit more risky. I 
tk the date of application depends on whether the application is military or 
mercial. I would like to congratulate General Dynamics for applying a fly-by- 
3 system to the YF-16 airplane. If they're successful , the next military applica- 
will  be a lot easier. If they're not successful, it's back to the drawing board 
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for all of us. But I might remind you that on many of the commercial airplanes some 
of yoy will be going home on, the system is *"fly-by-fluid , I t  and that of course was 
not too acceptable a few years back. The flutter mode control system is in a more 
experimental stage, and I think we will  have to do much more work in this area, 
looking at explosive flutter and other aspects, before it will be accepted. 
Not only does our technology need to be developed but we need to understand 
its applications. We have the ability to evaluate the performance benefits of the I 
concepts we can flight test. The benefits of the concepts are configuration sensi- 
tive, but we have a reasonably good ability to flight validate them. However, when 
it comes to the ability to make predictions on the basis of preliminary design tech- 
niques, we come up rather short. You've heard discussions of the ability to repre- 
sent airplane structural modes for paper airplanes or for newly designed and intro- 
duced airplanes. Well, I don't share quite all the pessimism, but I do think that we 
need to do more work in this area. 
What I feel is lacking, however, is persuading the designer to take full advan- 
tage of these concepts. Ask how many rivets a designer leaves out of an airplane 
because he has an active control system. O r  how much thinner he is willing to 
make the lower wing skin because maneuver load control is available to him. Our 
experience to date is that active control technology has been used like Band-Aids. 
We've been willing to patch up the deficiencies'of existing airplanes by using some 
of these concepts. A history of active control technology applications over the past 
1 0  years includes the B-52 airplane, which had a stability augmentation system 
that was developed in 1964. The B-52 airplane was designed as a high altitude 
bomber. In 1958 it was given the role of flying low, and it didn't take it very long 
to develop a fatigue problem. Now, this stability augmentation system was designed 
to alleviate part of that fatigue problem, a Band-Aid, if you will .  We generally 
refer to this system as the ECP-1195 system. That system started at the same time 
as or slightly before the research program called load alleviation and mode stabili- 
zation, and there is a "-year period from the time the program began until load 
alleviation and mode stabilization was incorporated in a fleet. Now, perhaps 
finishing the research a little earlier would have reduced the time; however, we 
saw from Tom Disney's report that it is taking several years to incorporate active 
controls in the C-5 airplane. And again it is a case of patching up a deficiency, a 
Band-Aid. 
We've also had intensive research for 1 0  years in the area of active flight 
controls or control-configured vehicles. On Tuesday Dr . Kurzhals showed bar 
charts indicating that research in active control technology would take another 
8 years, and if  so I question the idea that we're on the threshold of a revolution. 
Instead, we're just continuing an evolutionary process, and maybe that's the way 
it ought to be. However, if it's true that we require an additional 8 years, I think 
we ought to change our acronym from CCV for control-configured vehicles to CCC 
for creation of control careers. Perhaps I'm being a little unfair or impatient in 
wanting to get on with it,  but I believe that NASA has an important role in bringing 
active control technology into usable shape. 
Dick Holloway mentioned yesterday, and I'd like to reiterate, that we need an 
airline type of airplane to fly with these concepts incorporated in it. It should fly 
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an airline route, and it should be subject to the same conditions the airlines are 
subjected to each day. I don't feel that this would be exorbitantly expensive. I 
think it would be research money well spent. I've heard comments on various ways 
to bring this about , and I think we ought to consider some of these and investigate 
this way to spend some of the research money. The other area I'd like to suggest 
that NASA do some research in was mentioned by others, including D r  . Perkins, 
and that is preliminary design. So let's create a real design , using some of these 
concepts. So I say to NASA, you get the money , we've got the ideas. 
F .  W .  Kolk: I think economics is the key to all this. We've got to have a pay- 
off. We have to have not only a predictable but an achievable payoff. The airline 
community has been enamored of a number of things that have had a great effect on 
our airplanes but which in some cases have had a rather indifferent payoff. One 
example of that is the all-weather landing system. If we think about it,  the all- 
, weather landing system has been worthless so far. That isn't to say it won't be 
worth something some day, but the admission price has been fantastic and the show 
hasn't started yet , so to speak. We can't afford another debacle like that. So let's 
figure out what our real payoffs are and be sure that we get them and be sure that 
we  don't spend too much money getting them. 
Acceptance is another problem. In some sessions , people calculated the basic 
system reliability to be somewhere between 
Keep in mind that the loss of the airplane is at the other end of this probability 
thing. I think I also heard Dick Sliff say just a few minutes ago that the FAA is 
thinking in terms of 10-l' for this sort of thing. It seems to me that our airworthi- 
ness code is somewhere on the order of to It has been a long time since 
we were on the airworthiness circuit and had to learn probability, but I think those 
are the correct numbers. 
and'10-6 (failures per flight hour). 
Now maybe we're at lom5 but maybe from experience the FAA is right and we 
need 10-lo.  It's a long way from l o e 5  to 10-l' , This is going to be a probability 
game. Now , when we have probability , we have several problems. One of them is 
that we have a bunch of airplane drivers and they're not much interested in proba- 
bility. They haven't really been schooled in it  as a discipline. All  they want to 
know is whether it will  happen or won't happen on an absolute basis: they don't 
want to be dead. I think we could cause them quite a bit of concern with this kind 
of thing. 
Then , of course there's the business of the accuracy of the predictions. If 
you're going to have a system in which somebody comes up and puts a chart on the 
wall and says it has a reliability of loq1', how does he know? How can he prove it 
without spending 20 years testing the components to get failure rates? When you 
have failure rates like this, it implies that you either have a lot of junk in the air- 
plane with some pretty complex interreactions to protect against failures or you've 
got things that are so reliable that it's not in your ability to create a failure within 
your lifetime. I think we have a problem. 
Then, of course, there is the infant mortality problem-what happens in the 
first 500 hours or 600 hours after the introduction of a device into airline service 
when all of a sudden it doesn't work. Maybe the airline people will understand it 
and maybe they won't, but we've had to live through a few of these clambakes. 
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Well, it's not all bad. We've been sneaking up on active controi technology for 
quite a while. Somebody said we've been flying by fluid for years , and we have. 
We've been flying airplanes around with increasing amounts of power boost to the 
point where they're really totally powered now. The difference between power 
boost and fully powered controls is simply the feedback ratio to the pilot. When it 
becomes infinite , the pilot can't do anything anyway if something happens. There 
are a lot of airplanes flying with manual reversion provisions. But if a pilot ever 
has to revert to manual control, he has a pretty limited flight envelope. So we've 
already faced that problem , although we haven't called it fly by wire. 
Another problem is psychological. The airline community has been brought up 
on hard-earned truths that were learned in the DC-3 era or with early DC-4 air- 
planes or during World War 11. In those days something was reliable if it was a bar 
of iron or a thick steel cable. If you wanted to have something not quite as good as 
that but with more muscle , you made it hydraulic. That was somewhat less accept- 
able. If you really wanted to get fancy and stick your neck out, you made it elec- 
tric, but the last thing you did was make it electronic, because everybody knew 
that wasn't going to work and it didn't. Now it's 30 years later and it seems that 
the order of the reliability of those things has reversed. But most people in the 
airlines haven't found that out yet. We've got an education problem. 
Then you've got the syndrome in which here's the technology looking for a 
mission. I think that several of our panel speakers have touched on that. I don't 
know what you do with active control technology. I mean I think what you do is 
disconnect the pilot mechanically and fly through an electrical system, which 
sounds pretty good, but I don't know what the benefits are. The full benefits will  
only come out in a totally new vehicle design, and this totally new vehicle design 
is going to be pretty hard to come by. Commercial aviation won't be able to afford 
any kind of totally new vehicle design for a few years. So since we're not going to 
have an immediate chance for a full-scale application, I would say you have to slug 
it out and find out what you can on an interim basis, Band-Aids if you will, and 
keep on making improvements. 
L .  L .  Treece: When Joe asked me to appear on this panel, he asked me if I 
wanted to prepare a 10-minute speech. I said I thought I'd do everybody a favor 
and not prepare a speech. I do have some thoughts on what I've seen here in the 
past few days , though. First , I'd like to repeat that those of us from the business 
end of the airplane are interested primarily in safety of operation and the creation 
of enough redundancy to insure that. Of course, to prove this we need an adequate 
test program. In addition, the economic consideration is all important to the 
industry. Some things have been presented here that look very appealing from an 
economic standpoint. Much work has been done, and I think we've come a long 
way already insofar as pilot acceptance is concerned. We've seen a degree of 
acceptance in the Caravelle , B-727 , B-747 , and other airplanes of the fluid line with 
the controls instead of the cable we're used to. And as far as the acceptance of fly 
by wire with the control wheel steering and so on is concerned, I don't think we'll 
have any difficulty selling it to the pilots once the safety aspects are proven. I 
don't know too many airlines that are going to put ejection seats in a $25 million 
investment to launch three pilots , who don't want to go anyway under those condi- 
tions, into the air to test a system. We're going to have to find a better way to do 
it than that. 
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PANEL AND OPEN DISCUSSION 
f 
Weil: What I would like to discuss first is the application of active control tech- 
nology to a medium- to long-haul conventional transport aircraft. 
Kolk: I believe that there will  be great tangible benefits in incorporating 
active control technology to these aircraft. The performance of the airplane will 
improve and therefore fuel consumption will decrease because the center of gravity 
will  be back where the horizontal tail helps rather than hinders. This implies 
flying some unstable airplanes and also implies putting the landing gear back where 
the airplane won't go over on its back when it's taking off or sitting on the ground. 
Certaiqly this is of paramount importance if we're ever going to have a supersonic 
transport. So I think I would make that an objective, probably an initial objective. 
I think the other possible objective is to take weight out of the wing by using a 
system for load relief. I think this is where a failed system will be a big problem. 
You can actually fly an unstable airplane, provided that it doesn't get too unstable 
statically, but it's pretty difficult to fly an airplane without a wing because some- 
thing electric has failed. I would put that order of priority on it. 
Carline: I think without question relaxed static .stability and fly-by-wire 
control systems should be considered for the next airplane, possibly with backup 
systems. Then, possibly at the same time, I think there's a case for improving the 
fatigue life of the airplane. We've had a lot of cracks in airplanes that have cost a 
lot of money to repair, I think the use of active controls to improve an airplane's 
fatigue life or to reduce the incidence of fatigue damage would be a good objective 
for the era we're talking about. 
Kolk: Yes, but I'd like to point out that the budget is limited. Take an airplane 
like the B-707. It sort of gets tired at 30,000 hours, so you reskin it for a couple 
of hundred thousand dollars and get another 30,000 hours out of i t .  Other airplanes 
I'm familiar with, like the DC-6 airplane, have gone through this cycle; in fact, I 
think there are DC-6 airplanes flying around that have been reskinned twice to 
keep them going. And it's actually a pretty economical way to extend the life of a 
structure. So unless you can do the job cheaply enough to make it cheaper than 
just reskinning , you haven't saved anything. 
Carline: It's a question of economic payoff. It's a trade, if  you like-you've 
got to weigh one against the other. What about the audience? 
J .  A .  Gorharn: A few years ago I had some responsibilities on the L-1011 air- 
plane to do with controls and cockpits and avionics, and I was guilty of persuading 
all the airlines to try all-weather landing systems. I'm not going to argue about 
that right now. 
Much has been said about the possible benefits of active control technology in 
terms of saving structural weight and space in the airplanes, center of gravity 
static margins and so on. I firmly believe that active control technology has a role 
to play , and I think that with an intelligent program .by NASA and industry we'll 
find out what it is and we'll make the tradeoffs. I think enough has been said 
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about the need to make tradeoffs with maintainability and reliability and the need 
for engineering proofs. The idea of the 1985 era worries me a little, Do you mean 
beginning to design a new transport in 1985 or that it will  be flying then? I think 
a better definition of what we mean by the 1985 era would be useful. 
Wei l :  We had in mind putting it in operation shortly after 1985, not starting a 
cycle that might go to 1995.  
Gorharn: I don't believe that. Looking at some of the timetables, I think it 
might be possible to begin a new airplane somewhere between 1980 and 1985, but 
not to have it in operation by that time if it's completely control configured and 
employs active control technology to a reasonable degree. 
One thing that hasn't been mentioned is the role active control technology could 
play in cockpit design. One of the things that I would like to have done with the 
L-1011 airplane , since a quadruplex automatic landing system has been installed 
that can be depended upon in landing, is to cut all the cables and take out the con- 
trol column , which obscures the lower row of instruments. So if we are going to 
have fly-by-wire systems, let's get rid of the control column and improve the dis- 
play area in the cockpit. That's obviously one advantage. 
Secondly, we have programs at Langley, which I'm concerned with to some 
extent , on the B-737 terminally configured vehicle in which we're developing all 
sorts of advanced electronic displays. A s  most of you who have been involved with 
commercial or even military transports know , there just isn't any place to put 
electronic maps except behind the throttles, so let's get rid of the throttle levers 
too. If we're going to go fly by wire on the primary controls, we can do it on 
thrust control as  well. 
In other words, there are advantages up at the front end that to my knowledge 
haven't been mentioned during this symposium. That's where the pilots are going 
to see the benefits, and that might just help us persuade them that this thing is 
worthwhile. 
As far as major obstacles are concerned, I think most of them have been dis- 
cussed already. New commercial transports are begun, not because we plan it or 
want it,  but because of competition. There will be more world competition now, 
not just competition within the United States , and when we start to race , if I'm any- 
where involved, I don't want to try on a new pair of track shoes. I want to know 
that the shoes are going to take me to the end of the race already. 
J. J .  Tyrnczyszyn: I think we're all missing one point, and that's the applica- 
tion of active control technology to vortex wake turbulence alleviation. We all 
realize that active control technology is a powerful tool, but it hasn't been fully 
explored yet, and that is one point we should be thinking about in the near future. 
a .  
W e i l :  That's a good point, except that some of the small airplanes that intersect 
these wakes probably won't have it.  
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W .  G. WeZZs , J r  , : We've been listening, of course to a discussion of 5 or 
6 years of NASA's experience with the merits and demerits of active controls. I'm 
keenly interested in Mr . Treece's and Mr . Kolk's comments, also Mr . Newberry's, 
about the great need for reliability, acceptance by the pilots , and economic viability. 
NASA has worked with the F-8 digital fly-by-wire airplane but my question is 
addressed to M r  . Newberry's recommendation that someone ought to fly an airline 
type of airplane for an extended period of time to acquire this type of information. 
Now, NASA has not been in the protytype business, and it seems to be buffeted in 
various directions-told to get out of or into the prototype business. I'd like to get 
some type of reaction from the panel as  to whether this is an appropriate thing for 
NASA to be involved in in the future. That is, whether it should undertake a proto- 
type program. 
Newberry: Well, in my view, the role that NASA ought to play is one that's 
helpful. In the early days, NACA developed airfoils when other people didn't have 
the opportunity or capability to. I think that through the years NASA has become 
oriented towards basic research. Certainly I'm in favor of basic research, but I 
think that any government agency ought to assist and not to resist. If indeed it's 
the greatest help to put this airplane into service, to drive it around and develop 
so many hours, and as Frank mentioned it takes a long time for confidence to grow, 
I think it needs to be done in a good environment. Ted Bowling gave a paper on 
B-52 stability augmentation system reliability, and in it he showed a growth curve. 
The growth curve had a slope of 0 . 5 6 .  Now, the average growth curve for those is 
0 . 3 .  The reason for the difference is that a great deal of attention was paid to that 
particular program. Something was done about every little thing that showed up. 
We recently installed a forward-looking infrared system in a low light television 
system on the B-52 airplane and again we had an extensive reliability program. 
That program too had a growth curve of approximately 0.56. It takes a lot of 
attention to get reliability. It takes the minute examination of resistors solder 
joints, and what have you. There's just no substitute for time, and we need to get 
started if we're going to have it.  So I think that a prototype program is a good 
project for NASA. It's a project the rest of us can't afford. I don't think the air- 
lines can afford to set an airplane aside and fly it without passengers just to get 
time. I don't think a manufacturer can do that. I think this is a role that govern- 
ment can play and can be helpful in doing so. 
Kolk: I'd like to add to that. I think that not ohly is the role a proper one for 
NASA-it's also a role that in other areas NASA has already begun to play. I think 
that NASA's role in the JT8 refan program is similar, and the end result looks 
like a finished product. They have also worked in other programs like this , and 
I think it's a good thing for the total community for NASA to do it. Now, in terms 
of actually choosing an airplane to fit with active controls you have to look around 
at what's available. If you want to use an airplane that will eventually have other 
uses, you'll have some other problems besides the control system. You'll have to 
have an airplane with a lot of redundancy built into its design. The earlier genera- 
tion jet transports do not have this redundancy, and you'd wind up with a whole 
new airplane by the time you built it in. However, the newer airplanes particu- 
larly the trijets and the B-747 airplane, do have redundancy built in because they 
all envisioned all-weather landing systems. So the guts of the airplane can take it 
and these may be the airplanes to use. I don't know how you're going to make the 
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transition from getting that kind of hardware together and demonstrating that it'll 
fly to putting it into passenger service, which is the only way you're going to get 
the kind of time on it to prove it.  
A .  B . BarracZough: I'd like to address the question of the obstacles to greater 
commitment to active control technology and turn it around and ask what can be 
done to aid its application, specifically by NASA. One thing that hasn't received 
much attention is the requirement for reliability data. The requirement is to 
acquire data in such a way that the data can be used at the drawing board level. 
One of the significant international benefits of the last generation of aircraft was 
that there was a data base you could go to and find out the reliability of a given 
component and how the airlines used i t ,  You could go to a maintenance manual and 
see where it was used in the system and what it looked like. You could rearrange 
it to use in your own system and come up with some reasonably good probability 
figures which told you its safety, its unscheduled removal time, its mean time 
between scheduled removals , and its maintenance man-hour costs-in effect, every- 
thing from its cost to its everyday usage. With some useful trade factors, you could 
then compare all of these different costs, put them on a unit basis and come up with 
some kind of total trace of cost. You could compare an electrical system with a 
mechanical system, a pneumatic system , or whatever. You could then go to the 
chief designer and say that this system was better than this one on a rational basis. 
He could of course decide one way or the other. But it is a useful tool. One thing 
that can be done with the electrical systems is to set up a system that allows infor- 
mation to be collected that can be used at the drawing board level. This requires 
familiarity with the information system, the ability to become familiar with it, which 
means some kind of publication, and finally dispersal throughout the industry. So 
the question for industry is what they can do for NASA along these lines. 
Weil: I gather that you're suggesting that NASA or some government organiza- 
tion underwrite this type of thing? 
Barraclough: No,  I wouldn't say NASA specifically, but I think there is a 
major obstacle, which is that we don't have a data bank with which we can compare 
things. 
Lamar: The Air  Force has a sy;:em much like the one you're discussing. The 
system collects data in quite some detail on component removals,, the time between 
removals, and the cause of the problem. The data are analyzed right down to the 
basic level. Of course, the problem is that that kind of information does not exist 
for the new systems we're talking about because there is no flight experience with 
them. It does exist for a lot of command augmentation systems that do have elec- 
tronic components, however. 
Barraclough: I understand. I didn't mean to bypass the Air  Force system, but 
the point is that there is no system that addresses itself to the question of active 
controls and flying controls by wire. 
_ I  
Weil: We've heard quite a bit about ongoing programs and programs that are 
planned for 5, 6 ,  or 7 years from now. The space shuttle certainly is one. How 
much confidence are these programs going to produce compared with what exists 
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right now? Is there any way to increase their relevance or to change their direction 
in such a way that they could be made more pertinent to the airlines? 
Kolk: The problem is that active control technology is sort of a technology 
looking for a mission. I would like to have a better idea of exactly what active con- 
trol technology will accomplish when it is applied to transports. That will provide 
a road map for making decisions, and until you have one you cannot address the 
issue intelligently. 
Weil: This is a little far afield from the conventional transport area, but the 
Boeing YC-14 airplane has a digital flight control system which is pseudo fly by 
wire. It will fly within the next couple of years. If we have a reasonable number 
of hours on a vehicle of that type, would that provide the type of confidence needed 
for a long-haul conventional transport? 
Kolk: Every little bit helps! 
Newberry: Another question is whether ongoing government and industry 
programs adequately address the obstacles to the use of active control technology. 
Unless I misunderstood, M r  . Skully said that in 1960 the FAA held a conference 
to update its regulations. From what Bill Lamar and I have presented, most of the 
action has taken place since 1960. Now is that the aggressive action the FAA is 
giving us in regard to these regulations or did I misunderstand? 
Skully: Frankly, the FAA has been putting out regulations on a more or less 
ad hoc basis over the last decade. The FAA is following the Concorde activities. 
The French and British hope to have it ready to be certificated next spring, and of 
course that is a fly-by-wire piece of equipment. I had the privilege of riding in it 
from Boston to Miami and returning, and there were a few things going on that 
surprised me. The approach mode was made with the autothrottle. A question was 
raised earlier as to why you have the throttle , and it's a good point. The throttle 
is there just because it's traditional. The captain was flying the Concorde manually, 
and he programed his airspeed with the autothrottle. The autothrottle was just 
providing the thrust necessary to maintain his reference speed. 
We're looking at our landing distance requirement again from a certification 
standpoint. The Concorde doesn't have flaps, and it doesn't have spoilers. We 
are working with NASA quite actively to try to determine a better way to assess 
runway slipperiness. All these efforts will  help to establish or modify the regula- 
tions. 
C. L .  Seacord: There are two rather new programs that are intended to 
address the obstacles. One is to determine the measure of acceptability of the 
advanced systems. 
We've had some experience recently with trying to find out what's required 
for the autoland sensors in terms of reliability for the all-weather landing system. 
Maybe integrity is the right word these days. It's extremely difficult to find a 
realistic, usable failure rate probability number. There's talk about changing the 
probability from to lo-' . When you look at the reason for doing so there really 
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isn't one. Neither is there a good way to measure what we have. I think one worth- 
while activity for the FAA is the reevaluation and restatement of the integrity 
requirements and the way in which the requirements are measured. 
In addition, there is a series of operations that could be performed to generate 
the data that the airlines would like to have and undoubtedly need. They don't 
need to have a prototype airplane or two prototype airplanes flown a few hundred 
hours a year. They need, as several people have already mentioned , data for on 
the order of 50,000 hours of flight in a realistic transport environment. The only 
way these data can be obtained is by installing some of this equipment, representa- 
tive fly-by-wire equipment , whether it's being used for that or not , on airplanes 
in scheduled service. Perhaps they operate in a parallel , duplicate way, so you 
can throw a switch and take it out of the system and the airplane can go on about 
its business. This is a program that neither the aircraft industry nor an airline 
is likely to pay for; therefore, I think it is up to a government agency or a combina- 
tion of DOT , NASA , and the military. I think that even prior to that , though , you 
need to try to figure out how you're going to run the big program. Because I 
think that even i f  someone popped up with $10 million right now and said "Go do it ,Iv 
there would be about 4 years of confusion about what you were going to do and what 
you would record and how you would analyze what you did record. 
So I think you need a program to define the requirements, to determine what is 
good enough, what's reliable enough, and how to measure it. Then there should be 
an introductory program, probably involving flight tests of a representative jet air- 
plane, to develop techniques for the large program. The large program would then 
consist of the government procurement of the systems and their installation and 
record keeping for them. The systems should be used in regularly scheduled ser- 
vice to produce at least 50 , 000 hours of data. 
G .  0 .  Thompson: It seems to me that programs with clearly defined goals are 
the ones that make major contributions. I think one reason so much was accom- 
plished in the Saturn-Apollo program was that the goal was so clearly defined. You 
may recall that in a movie von Braun produced, he stated that that was one of the 
most important reasons that that program succeeded. It had a clear goal: go to the 
moon, return, and land safely, by 1970. That goal was accomplished. That goal 
was kept in front of everyone. It seems to me that one of the biggest problems in 
active control technology is that neither we nor NASA has a clearly defined goal. 
I'm somewhat familiar with NASA's plans. I think that one of the biggest contribu- 
tions we could make would be to motivate NASA's management to establish a clearly 
defined goal within the framework the panel has discussed and set a time period for 
that goal. 
Wei l :  A s  I understand you, you're saying that NASA should bite the bullet and 
instead of going to the moon establish a goal of perhaps 20 percent to 25 percent 
improvement in performance or fuel savings and then go after it? 
Thompson: I'm saying that NASA needs clearly defined goals for commercial 
transports comparable to those that were established for space. 
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WeiZ: How do you justify that to the Office of Manpower and Budget? I think 
the answer to that is that we have to run cost-benefit studies, and if we come up 
with a ratio of benefit to cost of 20 or 25 to 1 and believe it I think the risk is good. 
J .  7'. Rogers: A s  a conservative structures guy I would like to see an effort 
made to separate the benefits of using control configurations from the benefits to an 
actual airplane. For example the load alleviation studies generally have talked 
about moments, but you'll find when you design a wing that torsion plays a fairly 
important part and that all the controls we have talked about are large torsion 
producers. So one of the things I think would contribute a lot would be to separate 
the items that contribute a large payoff from items that fall in the gray area of "is 
it or is it not a gain, 
Newberry: In this field, as in many fields, we have a great deal of synergism. 
When we start to introduce one or two things we get additional benefits. One of the 
things we saw in the C-5 presentation was that it had a restriction similar to one 
we had on the B-52 airplane, and that is the use of control surfaces that were 
already there e Those control surfaces were deliberately designed not to stir up 
structure modes. Now we're constrained to yse them to damp structure modes. I 
think if the designer has some freedom to apply the concepts we're talking about 
we'll see many more benefits. The fact that there is4orsion is obvious if you're 
going to use only a trailing-edge device. Why not use the trailing edge and the 
leading edge together and eliminate that sort of thing? You're right, we need to 
sit aside and look at these benefits as they are,  but I think that we ought not be too 
quick to say that we'll throw out anything under 1 0  percent. That one thing may 
be the catalyst that brings other benefits into being, so it becomes beneficial for 
the total active control airplane. 
P. G .  FeZZeman: As far as NASA funding a large program to demonstrate safety 
or reliability or whatever by implementing active controls in a large fleet of aircraft 
is concerned, I don't think that is a goal NASA should be involved in. I think NASA 
should be bringing technology to a state where it is feasible and available. When 
the cost benefits come along, for example, when there is another 3O-percent, 40- 
percent, or 100-percent increase in fuel costs, the airlines will  be quick to look for 
things that will reduce those costs and that will make active controls the economi- 
cally viable thing to do. It happened in the inertial navigation business. Inertial 
navigation was not developed for the commercial aircraft industry. It was devel- 
oped for other purposes. When the airlines saw the economic feasibility of using 
inertial navigation, it became available to them. 
Newberry: I don't think it's very progressive to say that because NASA has 
had a certain role over the years it ought to keep that role and not step into 
another area. 
J .  K .  Wimpress: I think I agree with Dick Holloway's comments yesterday, 
They aren't going to revolutionize 
that control-configured vehicles and active control technology are really just a part 
of the aeronautical engineer's bag of tricks 
the whole appearance of the airplane. They're just other things that will have to 
be integrated into the airplane. And I think it's difficult to set goals for that kind 
of thing. 
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I think back 20 years when the airlines were dragged into the jet age. At that 
time they didn't want anything new either e They predicted dire things for the jet 
engine; they used too much fuel, you couldn't even stand to taxi out with them; 
nobody knew what their reliability was; they had terrible balance problems; how 
were they ever going to maintain them. Of course, once jet engines were in service, 
the airlines found that they set an entirely new standard and that the problems 
weren't nearly as great as anticipated. The engines used by the first jet transports 
were military. They were developed for the military and went through the kind of 
process Bill Lamar discussed for evaluation. If you look at the number of hours on 
the jet engine at the time it went into commercial service, it was actually quite low 
compared with the number the airlines began putting on it,  and yet the engine 
served well. In the case of the engines, then, the commercial incentive got to be 
such that the engine was constantly improved, and engines like the turbofanjet 
were developed not for the military but for the commercial people. The point is 
that the airlines were willing to accept an engine entirely new to them on the basis 
of military experience that was relatively low, yet large enough to be statistically 
valid. I can see the same path for the fly-by-wire control system. The military 
will  have to take the lead; they'll put it on some of the airplanes they're going to 
use over an appreciable length of time, and that will  develop enough time to be 
statistically valid and it can then be put into commercial service. In our thinking 
we should also distinguish between the electronic control and so-called control- 
configured vehicles. Confidence has to be developed in electronics and electric 
systems and not in the ability of the control surface to move and create an aerody- 
namic load that will favor the airplane. The former can certainly be developed in 
the way that I've described. I think the latter has just developed as part of the 
preliminary design process. 
R. E .  Coykendull: I think that we in the airlines are somewhat impressed with 
what the military has done with some of these systems and the expertise that has 
been developed. On the other hand, we also feel that the military is somewhat 
enamored of the airlines' philosophies and practices. That is to say, they are now 
coming to the airlines, asking us to show them how to maintain vehicles on a long- 
term basis. This presents an opportunity for a program wherein the military and 
the airlines pool their information on the maintainability of aircraft and aircraft 
systems in particular. That could be turned to real advantage in that it would show 
what the airline maintainability requirement for active control technology really is. 
Do you agree, Frank? 
KoZk: That's basically right. You know we've got a whole host of gadgets on 
airplanes that are there for a good reason, and if  they go awry, funny things 
happen. I think one of the most startling pieces of machinery I ever had anything 
to do with was the stick pusher. We operated a fleet of 30 airplanes for a number 
of years with stick pushers and I never knew the stick pusher to bomb out on us.  
It always worked when it was supposed to work and it didn't go off when it wasn't 
supposed to go off. You can come up with all kinds of examples of things that will 
have to work full time, with no bail-out route, to take full advantage of active con- 
trol technology. 
So the military people get into active control technology and General Dynamics 
wants to expand the maneuver envelope for their lightweight fighter so they make 
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the tail work for them instead of against them. It was a big payoff in an intensely 
competitive situation. It's a pretty interesting system, but the point is that at least 
on the face of it they seem to have made it work and for the first time. This kind of 
background is going to help. Now I think the airlines should be a little less chary 
of sharing some of the information that they have. They have so much information 
in bits and pieces collected over the years that it's a monster of a chore just to get 
it all in one place. Some of that material might relate to these problems. Some of 
our experience with electronics may also pertain to some of these things, and I 
would like to see something set up on a cooperative basis. Certainly we can try. 
And certainly some of the things we found out about engines are of interest to the 
military people, because I understand that they have to make them work the first 
time now or they don't sell them. We have the same problem. All of us are faced 
with this problem. We've got to minimize risk, and how do we devise a system that 
minimizes risk? Maybe NASA can serve as a catalyst for this. 
I think this meeting is significant, because this is the first time in 20 years that 
I've seen this many people in a room talking about airplanes. I've been going to 
meetings for a long time and I want to congratulate everyone for coming and I want 
to congratulate NASA for inventing some way to get everyone together, which I was 
afraid was a lost art these days. Just talking like this is going to help. There's 
something there and we need to use it. It's not a cult. It's a tool, and now it's a 
question of rolling up our sleeves and getting on with the job. Anything construc- 
tive has got to be taken in a constructive way and I think we're all willing to do 
that. 
R .  E .  Kestek: The problem we seem to be working on is benefits for commer- 
cial transport. We pointed out that the safety required to fly your grandmother is 
of prime importance yet difficult to achieve. How do you do it? You need her on 
board to pay for the flight unless you have a large amount of money from some other 
source. In past programs, the airlines relied on the efforts of the military, which 
I think has some possibilities. Some people have talked about that. Sitting here, 
an idea occurred to me. There is a commercial airliner in military service that is 
being serviced by the commercial airlines. That is the T-43 airplane, and I believe 
it's being serviced by United Airlines. One of our problems is to get the airlines 
and the military to talk to each other, and here is a vehicle that is identical to an 
airline vehicle, being flown at high speeds and low altitudes, where fatigue is a 
problem and ride is a problem. Here is a vehicle with a need for active control 
technology, and it is being serviced by the airlines, who w e  are trying to get the 
information to. It is being flown by the military, so we can install a system in it 
for a reasonable price. It seems as though that would be a good approach to take 
to investigate the various aspects of this problem. 
Coykendall: To comment on this question, yes, we are under contract to the 
Air Force to maintain a fleet of T-43 airplanes. Not all of the actual manpower is 
ours, but the maintenance program is and four of our people are stationed at the 
Air Force base in Sacramento to supervise the program. I'm not aware of any 
restrictions on exchanging information in that program. 
In this case, the Air  Force came to an airline and said that it thaught the way 
the airlines maintained airplanes over the long term had some advantages compared 
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with the way the Air  Force did it and asked the airlines to do it for a while. This 
presented an opportunity for the Air Force to experience monitoring the results 
and collecting the information necessary for long-term maintenance. I don't think 
it's even necessary to have active control technology systems as such installed in 
those airplanes. What I am referring to is giving the military the opportunity to 
observe airline objectives and goals in maintenance and maintainability. 
C. D. Bardick: If we take the stick out of the cockpit, and I guess we would 
take the rudders out too, and we take the throttles out of the cockpit and put a 
couple of little switches in there, I wonder how the pilot is going to feel about 
looking at the instruments and all the information that is presented to him for the 
purpose of flying the airplane by hand through the stick, rudder, and throttle. 
Maybe NASA should look at the interface between the automatic control systems, 
which are creeping into commercial vehicles in increasing numbers, and the human 
operator, whose role is changing from being the operator to being more of an assist- 
ant manager. Are we in fact, providing the airline captain with the kind of infor- 
mation he needs to manage these automatic control systems in essentially a nonoper- 
ator's role? Maybe NASA should undertake it because if  an airline does i t ,  it's 
kind of touchy for airline management and the Airline Owners and Pilots Associa- 
tion (AOPA) e It's kind of a touchy subject for the Boeing, Lockheed, or Douglas 
people to get involved with, and it's kind of a. touchy subject for the FAA to get 
involved with, so it seems as if  NASA may be the only organization that can touch 
it without having its fingers burned. Since we have an airline captain on the panel, 
maybe he would like to address the subject of the flight crew's role in increasingly 
automatic airplanes. 
Treece: I'd like very much to talk about it. First, we accepted the wheel in 
transports years ago as opposed to the stick and now we're back to the stick. So 
I think we're amenable to something new. I think that there is a general movement 
in the industry to enlarge the role of airline captain to that of manager. You should 
realize that he's managing a pretty expensive segment of the airlines and that he is 
a manager. We're encouraging airline captains to manage better, and they have 
done a much better job. If you look at our fuel costs and the efficiency with which 
we have operated over the last 2 or 3 years, I think it is self evident that they are 
challenged by this and that they are doing a better job of managing. We talked at 
great length with some of the people in the FAA with respect to removing the con- 
trol column, the throttles, and the rudders and it opens up a lot of space we badly 
need for indicators and navigational equipment and that sort of thing. I think 
there's going to be some sort of resistance among the pilots to removing these 
traditional things, but it certainly won't take long to convince them if it is in fact a 
better way. I don't have any objection to i t ,  I think it could be sold very easily 
once it has been shown that it?s a better way. 
Somebody made a remark a while ago about buying new equipment. Not too 
many airlines are beating a path to airplane manufacturers' doors these days 
looking for new equipment over and beyond what they're already committed for. 
There's some thought that some of us have too much, so we're not looking for any 
new problems at the moment. But the airlines will adopt, and not reluctantly , 
something that is more efficient, safer to operate, or has some other type of advan- 
tage. This is no different than in the past. I don't think the airlines are going to 
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get together and sell the manufacturers on active control technology or control- 
configured vehicle equipment. The manufacturers are going to have to grab this 
ball and convince the users that this is a better way to go. 1 
Gorham: I had some comments a while ago, but in view of what's been said 
I've modified them a little. I was going to say that a new program is essential to 
establish the benefits of active control technology, and I think we've talked that to 
death, probably because it's pretty obvious that the tradeoffs have to be pretty 
well established to know what investigations you have to make. We're investigating 
active control technology. Fine, but is there anything in the structural area, the 
cockpit area or  any other part of the airplane which the tradeoffs show might 
bring benefits if changed or modified? Let's not get to a point in 5 years' time 
where the technology of fly by wire has been thoroughly investigated and is a tool 
that could be used and when we do the tradeoffs we find some other technology 
gives a greater payoff. A broad cut of tradeoffs must be established to decide what 
other areas of technology might relate to the incorporation of active control technol- 
ogy. 
Another point I'd like to make is that something happens because there's a need 
for it. This is getting back to Frank Kolk's point, which I don't take too much 
umbrage at, but which I will remember for a while, about all-weather automatic 
landing systems. I well remember the airlines' introducing a system called 
aircraft integrated data system (AIDS) 7 or 8 years ago. For those of you who 
don't know what AIDS is, it is a very complex recording system which a certain 
major airline hoped to install in an airplane. It involved more electronic boxes 
than were on the airplane at the time, and it was hoped that it would improve the 
reliability of the lesser avionics that were already being carried. It was kind of 
irrelevant. I remember standing up just like this in New York , and the speech I 
made was that I had sat there for 4 days and heard a detailed description of a solu- 
tion, but that I didn't really know what the problem was. So there are systems that 
go into airplanes where everybody has been mistaken. 
Multiplex entertainer, a complex and difficult system was introduced, and it 
fell into a lot of problems on the Boeing B-747, the Douglas DC-10, and the 
Lockheed L-1011 airplanes. However, when the airlines asked if they could take it 
off, and we asked if they would accept a 1000-pound weight penalty for taking it 
off, which is the weight of the wiring, of course they said no, My point is that 
there was really a big advantage. Some way had to be found to make it work, and 
we did. 
Finally, M r  . Seacord made a point about all-weather automatic landing systems 
and the need to look at the reliability of the sensors. I take exception to that, and 
I think the airlines and M r  . Skully should too, because we now have at least three 
airplanes certificated for all-weather automatic landing systems , and I'm sure the 
FAA and its British counterpart wouldn't have given that permission if they hadn't 
been satisfied with the sensors' reliability. His  point on lo" and IO-' is semantic, 
really. Without going into any details, one involves an individual risk and the 
other involves a collective risk. It's just a different way to do the bookkeeping. 
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Finally, I regard the aircraft industry as being all of us,  not as separate from 
NASA, DOT, and the airlines. Even consultants, I think, should be included in the 
airline industry. 
Skully: One of the comments I certainly supported was about establishing 
clear goals. I think that to attain these goals, and there's more than one, we'll 
have to make a well coordinated effort. It might be helpful to look at some other 
programs. One that two of my colleagues and I are very much involved in or have 
been, is the two-segment approach program. I am happy to see M r .  Wells from the 
House staff here, because the FAA has been beaten on the head pretty severely. 
NASA was funded by Congress to develop the two-segment approach. Frankly I 
don't know what went wrong. I don't know why we're in the state that we're in at 
the moment. American Airlines picked up the project and did a great deal of work 
on the B-707 airplane-Frank Kolk was the master mind, followed by United Airlines. 
Lloyd Treece and I have flown United's effort in the B-727 and DC-8 airplanes. We 
just finished the advance notice for rule making. It went over like a lead brick. 
The comments were due at the end of June, and I'm almost afraid to read them. The 
position of the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) is that they are very much 
against it. The Airline Pilot's Association (ALPA) , the AOPA, the National Business 
Aircraft Association (NBAA)-any organization you want to name thinks it's just 
terrible. The point I'm trying to get at here is that we've spent a lot of time, effort 
and money, and I don't know if it's going to fly'or not. Obviously, the objective is 
to reduce noise. I might add that I'm a little surprised that I haven't heard any com- 
ments during this symposium about what active control technology might do in terms 
of opening or keeping open some of the critically closed-in airports. If it does it 
has a payoff. 
Lamar: I believe ongoing programs in the Air  Force address the major obsta- 
cles to utilizing this type of technology. Of course, Air  Force cargo aircraft do 
have command augmentation systems in them. We are getting a lot of experience 
with them, and that experience is directly relatable to fly by wire. I think the next 
step would clearly be the fly-by-wire transport. Once we depend on fly by wire, 
we can without too much hesitation incorporate the control-configured vehicle con- 
cepts that have been shown to provide real payoffs in the design studies. What 
we're trying to do, of course, is to make options available to the designers. There 
are gaps in the program, and we're trying to f i l l  them. For example there is a 
lot of work under way right now and being planned to insure the satisfactory integra- 
tion of digital avionics so that the capabilities of digital processes are exploited 
in the military subsystems of the aircraft. We are also trying to exploit them for 
digital flight control. We are moving towards more digital flight control and the 
use of multimode capabilities. We are working on the displays, the controllers, and 
the other components that go with it. We are looking at what it takes to get the 
human operator integrated into it in the most economical fashion. 
The Air  Force is concerned about overhead and maintenance costs, operational 
costs. For that reason we are interested in pursuing any lessons learned by the 
airlines. If there is any way we can work together, I am sure that we will  be willing 
to do so. I think we ought to develop joint programs between NASA, the Navy, and 
the Air  Force to make our dollar go as far as possible to achieve this new technology. 
The basic program plans are under way, but they are underfunded. 
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Newberry: I would like to comment on what actions and coordination are 
needed. I think that this meeting itself is necessary and a first step in bringing 
industry, the airlines, and the aviation community together. I think that NASA and 
the Air  Force should be complimented for putting together this symposium. I think 
I speak for many others in saying that it has been an enjoyable symposium, enjoy- 
able in that it has provided an opportunity to meet old friends. All  of us tend to 
become too busy working in our own areas to communicate with others involved in 
the technology. This symposium has provided an opportunity for the inkrested 
and affected parties to discuss this important technology. 
WeiZ: Our time has run out for the panel discussion. I think it was quite 
productive. We at NASA appreciate the constructive comments on our programs from 
the airlines and industry, and I'm sure your comments will affect our thinking on 
future programs. I would like to thank the panel members and the audience for 
their participation. 
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